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ABSTRACT

The oil and natural gas reserves under the Caspian Sea
have sparked the interest of international investors and oil
firms. The political, economic, and social turmoil in the five
countries bordering the Caspian Sea, however, pose significant
challenges for effective regulation of multinational interaction
with the five Caspian states. A joint-effort approach to
regulation involving the World Bank, multinationalenterprises,
and the individual Caspian states' governments poses the most
functional and efficient means of instituting international
oversight. Such a tripartite structure connects the fortunes of
all the parties and provides safeguards against default by any
single entity. A mutually beneficial relationship may be
established whereby Caspian states benefit from receiving loans
at below-market interest rates and establishing sound
relationships with multinational enterprises and developed
economies. This tripartite structure promotes accelerating the
sustained development of the Caspian states while introducing
internationalnorms of corporate behavior. This Note addresses
the benefits, challenges, and potential that this joint-effort
approachto regulationof multinationalenterprises holds for the
Caspian region.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no issue in international business excites the passions of
multinational enterprises, environmentalists, and human rights
activists as much as oil and gas exploration and development. The
five Eurasian countries bordering the Caspian Sea (Russia,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Iran) lie at the center of
a global energy focus and are attracting interest from multinational
oil and gas firms.' Long isolated from first-world economies during
the Soviet era, the Caspian states, except Iran, now stand on the
verge of a major energy development that promises to bring
widespread economic and derivative social benefits to their economies
and societies from these oil and natural gas reserves, thanks to the
2
Caspian Development Project (CDP).
There is currently no single unified effort among the five
Caspian states to develop the oil and natural gas resources in the
Caspian seabed. 3
Rather, each state is considering separately
developing these resources, to varying degrees, with domestic
entities, multinational enterprises, and foreign governments. The
term CDP, therefore, is employed in this Note to describe the overall
development efforts of the five Caspian states relating to oil and
natural gas, and it should not be confused with an overarching,
unified development project.
Experts predict that by 2010, the countries of the Caspian Sea
region will produce between three and 4.7 million barrels of oil a day,
a total exceeding the annual production of South America's largest oil
producer, Venezuela. 4 Estimates for natural gas output are even
more optimistic, and many experts predict that the region has the
potential to produce quantities of natural gas comparable to that of
Saudi Arabia. 5 Given the vastly lucrative potential of the Caspian
region in these natural resources, it is easy to see why multinational
enterprises (MNEs) have been pressing the various Caspian
governments for involvement in developing these assets.
MNE investment in the Caspian region's oil and gas reserves
poses mutually beneficial prospects for both multinational businesses
and local governments alike by solidifying the economic stability in
this region. But, MNE involvement also accentuates the problematic
gap between profits and economic principles that, to a large degree,

1.
See generally United States Energy Administration, Country Analysis
Briefs: Caspian Sea Region, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs
caspian.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
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characterizes relations between private sector business interests and
national governments in the former Soviet states. Specifically, the
Caspian states, to varying degrees, have struggled with the
implementation of democratic reforms, such as income distribution,
human rights laws, and environmental protection. MNEs' combined
motivations for quickly maximizing profits and for a quick infusion of
capital, jobs, and corporate connections to first-world economies thus
create many incentives for shortcuts to be taken in establishing
development projects.
Given these pressures, what oversight, if any, is needed to
ensure that MNEs appropriately balance their own profit realization
with the sustained development of the host countries? This Note
suggests that internal oversight by MNEs alone is insufficient to
properly safeguard the interests of the citizens of the Caspian states.
Similarly, adopting a solely laissez faire attitude toward MNEs and
the respective Caspian governments in joint development projects in
extractive industries leaves open too great a possibility for corruption
and exploitation of the general populations by political elites. Since
the Caspian states lack fully democratic legal and social structures,
MNEs should be required not only to coordinate their development
activities with the Caspian governments, but also to conform with
some form of international regulation over MNE behavior. The nonrenewable nature of oil and gas reserves makes international
oversight imperative to ensure that the long-term well-being of the
various states' citizens and their environmental surroundings are not
compromised by MNEs' and current Caspian governments' desires for
quick profits.
The success of multinational investment in the oil and gas
sectors of the Caspian region depends upon the fulfillment of four
criteria.
First, entire fairness must be enforced in both the
substantive and procedural dimensions of the awarding and
structuring of development contracts. Second, guidelines must be
established to ensure that funds derived from the CDP are properly
distributed among the general populations to further their welfare.
Third, labor standards should be adopted that impose requirements
upon MNEs to employ as many local workers as possible and to
ensure that working conditions meet the standards imposed upon
similar projects in first-world economies. Finally, environmental
accountability must jointly be borne by MNEs and host nations to
ensure that the long-term environmental integrity of this area is not
compromised during the CDP.
Thus, this Note purports that
international oversight is needed to adequately promote sustained
socioeconomic development.
A new, non-traditional, and likely controversial form of
international oversight would best promote the four goals above.
This Note advocates that the World Bank Group (hereinafter, Bank)
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is the appropriate institution to conduct this oversight. The Bank's
current financing scheme, however, must be rethought if it is to hold
the Caspian states accountable for their loans. 6 Rather than granting
loans directly to Caspian states, the Bank should work in tandem
with MNEs when structuring loans for the CDP. Under this revised
system, the Bank would grant loans to MNEs instead of the Caspian
states. There are a number of benefits to this revised financing
structure. First, the net amount of capital available for financing
various CDP initiatives would approximate the amount that would be
available under traditional Bank financing schemes. Second, the
Bank should have recourse against loan defaults by pursuing legal
actions against defaulting MNEs in their respective countries of
incorporation. Third, in the case of the CDP, which centers upon the
extraction and development of lucrative natural resources, MNEs
should be permitted to seek collateral from the respective Caspian
states in the form of ownership of certain "fields" or development
Under this scheme, the Caspian states would still be
blocks.
responsible for paying to the MNEs the amount of the loan that the
MNEs received from the Bank. Coupling the interests of the MNEs
and host countries in this manner would provide a powerful incentive
for each side both to honor its obligations to the other and to pursue
development with the utmost zeal. Most important, however, is that
this structure would allow the Bank to condition loans to the MNEs
upon fulfillment of the four essential development criteria mentioned
Under this structure, the twin goals of multinational
above.
corporate governance and the sustained development of the Caspian
states will be promoted.
Part II of this Note explores the current economic and political
conditions in the Caspian region. Part III examines the challenges
and suggested reforms for existing political and economic conditions
in these states. Part IV addresses the issue of the legal status of
territorial boundaries of the Caspian Sea. Part V proposes the
importance of international oversight of multinational corporate
involvement in the CDP. Part VI studies the financing structure of
the World Bank and how it has traditionally operated. Part VII
analyzes various models for international oversight and proposes that
the joint-effort approach offers the most viable option for
international involvement. Part VIII offers final conclusions on this
topic.

See generally The World Bank Group, available at http://worldbank.org
6.
(last visited Jan. 24, 2005) (explaining current world bank financing schemes).

VANDERBIL T/OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

582

[VOL. 38.-577

II. CURRENT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE CASPIAN
REGION

A. Politicaland Economic Structures
In examining the various political and economic structures that
define the Caspian states, this Note will concentrate on the current
receptiveness of each state's governmental and economic apparatuses
to foreign investment and multinational involvement in the oil and
Understanding a government's attitude toward
gas industries.
foreign and multinational involvement in the CDP is crucial to
understanding how international oversight of such a process can be
implemented.
1. Russia
As the former center of the Soviet Union, Russia enjoys several
Russia's existing
advantages over other Caspian states.
infrastructure for oil refining and export capacity, complete with
outside sea ports, is far superior to that of the other littoral states7
given the Russo-centric design of former Soviet economy.
Throughout the Soviet period, natural resources were extracted from
the outlying Eurasian republics and directed to Russia where
refineries would then handle the goods. 8 Russia built more refineries
and employed far more workers in this industry than did the other
In fact, the development of the Russian
Caspian states. 9
infrastructure was advanced at the expense of these other states that
never developed the ability to process their own natural resources
Consequently, Russia's economic and social
domestically. 10
development progressed at a far more rapid rate than that of its
Caspian neighbors.'1
Currently, the Russian government is a federation headed by
President Vladimir Putin. 12 With a population of over 144 million
people, Russia is the largest and arguably most pro-Western of the
But, many questions still surround Russia's
Caspian nations. 13

7.
8.

Id.
Id.

9.
10.

Id.
Id.

11.
Id.
The World Bank Group, supra note 6.
12.
See United States Department of Commerce International Trade
13.
Administration, Russia Fact Sheet: 2002 Performance- Initial Year-End Data,
available at http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/2002RSFactsheet.htm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2005) [hereinafter USDCITA, Russia Fact Sheet] (for statistics concerning
Russia's economy).
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commitment to privatization.14 President Putin's arrest of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, the majority shareholder in Yukos, a Russian oil
giant, highlighted these uncertainties in the fall of 2003.15 Foreign
investors held their breath again when Putin dismissed the Russian
prime minister and entire Cabinet on February 21, 2004, two weeks
before the presidential election.' 6 Despite questions concerning
Putin's commitment to democratic governance, Russia has made
efforts to increase the transparency of its economic structure, and its
has helped to
diplomatic correspondence with Western democracies
7
investors.'
foreign
among
confidence
increase
Although it experienced a 4.9 percent decrease in GDP in 1998,
Russia has otherwise enjoyed a consistent annual increase in its
GDP, including a four percent growth in 2002.18 The United States is
the largest foreign direct investor in Russia, having invested $4.3
billion in Russian imported products between January and June of
19
2003, a fifty-five percent increase over the same period a year prior.
Cyprus, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Germany followed the
United States in direct foreign investment in Russia in 2002.20 Oil
was the leading export to the United States in 2002, accounting for
forty percent of U.S. imports from22 Russia. 21 Natural gas, however,
was not a major export for Russia.
Russia has put significant effort into developing a more complete
registration and licensing scheme for private entities within its
borders. 23 In addition, infrastructure improvements are being made
24
in the rail sector to facilitate the transport of goods and resources.
In short, while questions exist concerning the current Russian
administration's commitment to privatization and the extent to which
the state intervenes in economic activity, Russia recognizes the
importance of trade with free market economies, and its post-Soviet
25
economic progress reflects this understanding.

Id.
14.
15.
The Fallout from Mikhail Khodorkovsky's Arrest, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30,
2003, availableat http://www.economist.com.
Ryan Chilcote et al., Putin Fires Premier and Cabinet, at
16.
(last visited
http://www.cnn.com/2004fWORLD/europe/02/24/russia.putin/index.html
Feb. 22, 2004).
17.
False Calm, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2003, at 70.
See USDCITA, Russia Fact Sheet, supra note 13.
18.
19.
Id.
Id.
20.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
Trade
International
of Commerce
Department
United
States
23.
available at http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/rusfed.cfm
Administration,
[hereinafter USDCITA].
24.
See USDCITA, Russia Fact Sheet, supra note 13.
And the Owner Is?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2003, at 71.
25.
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2. Kazakhstan
With a population of 14.8 million people, vast oil and gas
reserves, and a government that is relatively friendly to international
parties, the Republic of Kazakhstan displays positive indicators for
successful integration of the CDP. 26 In 2002, Kazakhstan enjoyed a
9.5 percent growth in GDP, but with gross national income per capita
at only U.S.$1,510. With thirty-eight percent of its population living
below the national poverty line, the improvement of social welfare
27
programs remains one of the nation's foremost concerns.
Kazakhstan's government is a constitutional republic with a
28
strong executive headed by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Presidential elections are held every seven years, and President
Nazarbayev has been in power since 1991, winning re-election for a
second seven-year term in 1999.29
The Constitution of 1995
concentrates power in the presidency, thus curtailing the power of the
judiciary and legislature.3 0 Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has expressed
continued interest in foreign investment from multinational oil
companies, and it seeks to capitalize on international interest in its
31
energy resources.
In 2002, GDP grew a torrid 9.5 percent in Kazakhstan, and 6.3
percent GDP growth was predicted for 2003.32 Strong GDP growth
fueled a budget surplus from 2000 through 2002, but a small deficit
was expected for 2003. 33 International optimism in Kazakhstan's
economic progress is evidenced by the United States' promotion of the
nation to market status as defined by U.S. antidumping law.3 4 More
encouraging than the numerical indicators, however, are the
proactive steps such as the Draft Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan
on Investments of 2002 (hereinafter, the Draft Law) and the release
of the Caspian Oil Development Plan of 2003 (hereinafter, the
Plan).3 5 The Draft Law regulates investment relations, defines the
legal and economic grounds for encouraging investments, ensures the

26.
USDCITA, supra note 23.
27.
Id.
28.
United
States
Department
of
Commerce
International
Trade
Administration, Country Commercial Guide Kazakhstan, Fiscal Year 2004 (July 2003),
available at http://www.bisnis.doc.govbisnisbisdoc/0307KZCCGFYO4.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter USDCITA, Kazakhstan].
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
USDCITA, Kazakhstan, supra note 28.
35.
Azhar Kadrzhanova, Kazakhstan: Caspian Oil Development Plan, US
Commercial Service Almaty, available at www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/0307KZ
CaspOilProg.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
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protection of investors' rights, defines the means of state promotion of
investments, and establishes the procedure for the settlement of
disputes with the participation of investors. 36 While the necessity of
such a legal structure for governing investments is obvious, the Plan
offers a more detailed account of how the government is promoting oil
interests.3 7 The Plan is a three-stage project, consisting of an initial
stage involving geological exploration work, a second stage centering
on the actual development of Caspian reserves, and a final stage
focusing on stabilizing production levels. 38 As evidenced by these
legal and organizational guideposts, Kazakhstan's commitment to
and interest in partnering with foreign investors and multinational
39
oil companies is genuine.
3. Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is a republic of 8.21 million people that follows a
presidential form of government, and its political nature is reflective
of its crucial position in the geographic, economic, commercial, and
political crossroads of Eurasia. 40 President Heydar Aliyev, although
aging and facing some opposition, has been relatively progressive in
human rights policy. 41 The country's war against Armenia, in which
a cease fire agreement was reached in 1994, led to the displacement
of approximately 800,000 Azeri refugees. 42 Since 1999, however, the
Azeri government has worked with OSCE Minsk Group, an
international body composed of Russian, U.S., and French
representatives, to reach a compromise over the return of refugees to
Azerbaijan from Nagorno-Karabakh, an internationally unrecognized
43
republic established by Armenian forces.
The economic outlook for Azerbaijan is optimistic, despite its
paltry U.S.$710 gross national income per capita, and the fact that
44
fifty percent of its population falls below the national poverty line.
The energy sector promises the most potential, with oil and gas

36.
Id.
37.
Kadrzhanova, supra note 35.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
United
States
Department
of Commerce
International
Trade
Administration, Country Commercial Guide Azerbajan (2004), available at
http://www.bisnis.doc.govfbisnislbisdoc/O308AJCCG2004.pdf. (last visited Feb. 15,
2005) [hereinafter USDCITA, Azerbajan].
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. Nagorno-Karabakh is currently unrecognized as a legitimate territory
of Armenia given its establishment via war with Azerbaijan that ended in 1994. Id.
44.
See The World Bank Group, Azerbaijan Data Profile (Aug. 2004), at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountry=AZE&CCODE=
AZE&CNAME=Azerbaijan&PTYPE=CP (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
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generating over one-third of the nation's GDP. 45
The Azeri
government has been relatively open to foreign investment in its oil
industry, and it has consequently set up many production sharing
46
agreements between Azeri oil reserves and multinational oil firms.
Of the various oil reserves in the country, the Caspian region has the
most potential for oil development. 47 Azerbaijan has made concerted
efforts to take advantage of the Caspian's potential. 48 Significant
capital, both foreign and domestic, has been invested in developing
the offshore potential of Azeri Caspian Reserves. 49 The country has
implemented and stayed on track with the IMF's Poverty Reduction
and Growth program. 50 In addition to this IMF structural reform
program, the Azeri government continues to participate in a Second
World Bank Structural Adjustment Program, valued at $60 million,
intended to further reforms in public financial management and
governance. 5 1 While the government has a long way to go before
attaining economic stability, its willingness to engage in and abide by
international economic policies encourages foreign investors and
52
MNEs to become increasingly active in this nation.
4. Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is a country of 5.8 million people governed by a
single party state headed by authoritarian President Saparmurad
Niyazov. 53 The National Democratic Party, which succeeded the
54
Communist Party, is currently the only political party in the nation.
Relative to the Russian and Kazakhstani governments, the political
55
and governmental structure in Turkmenistan is far less stable.
Political analysts fear that members of the Turkmen Parliament are

45.
46.

USDCITA, Azerbajan, supra note 40.
Id.

47.

Id.

48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
See generally Press Release, International Monetary Fund, IMF Approves
US$18 Million PRGF Disbursement to the Azerbaijan Republic and Requests for
Waivers of Performance Criteria and Extension of Arrangement (May 15, 2003), at
http://www.imf.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). The Poverty Reduction and Growth
program operates in some of the most heavily indebted nations to encourage financial
responsibility, poverty reduction and growth in general economic conditions.
51.
See generally The World Bank Group, at http://www.worldbank.org (last
visited Jan. 24, 2005).
52.
USDCITA, Azerbajan, supra note 40.
53.
United
States
Department
of Commerce
International
Trade
Administration, Chapter III: Political Environment, available at http://www.bisnis.
doc.gov/bisnis/country/txChapter-III.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter
USDCITA, Political Environment].
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
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excessively compliant to President Niyazov's demands for fear of
being arrested. 56 Human rights groups claim that after a November
25, 2002 coup and assassination attempt on Niyazov, the President
had over 100 individuals arrested, beaten, and tortured for
information on the incident. 5 7 In addition, since originally assuming
power in 1992, and winning re-election in 1994 and 2002, Niyazov
has increasingly used elections as symbols of fabricated support for
his policies and has continually eroded the power of the Meijlis
(Parliament) and the Halk Maslahaty (People's Council).5"
Economically, Turkmenistan's natural resources, especially oil
and natural gas, make the country an attractive destination for
foreign investment. 59 The Turkmen government, because of its need
for foreign capital in sustaining its economic welfare, has expressed
some interest in foreign investment.6 0 But, severe political and
economic obstacles currently block infusion of foreign capital. 61 First,
62
governmental instability poses a serious risk to foreign investors.
Second, the state has a strong penchant for controlling economic
activity as evidenced by the fact that ninety percent of all economic
activity is state run.6 3 Thus, foreign investors still have legitimate
concerns about the expropriation of private foreign property and
capital.6 4 The government maintains tight control over revenue flow,
and fifty-nine percent of the Turkmen populace falls below the
national poverty level with a gross national income per capita of
U.S.$1,200. 65
Third, Turkmenistan's infrastructure needs to be
66
overhauled, particularly its roads and intercity infrastructure.
Similarly, Soviet-era equipment and technology must be replaced or
modified with current technology. 67 A restrictive currency scheme is

56.
See EurasiaNet, at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/
eav112502.shtml (n.d.).
57.
Id.
58.
USDCITA, Political Environment, supra note 53.
59.
Id.
The acronym GOTZ is used to abbreviate "Government of
Turkmenistan".
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
See The World Bank Group, Turkmenistan Country Brief 2004, World
Bank
Assistance,
available at, http://web.worldbank.orglWBSITE/EXTERNALI
COUNTRIES/ECAEXTfrURKMENISTANEXTN/0,,menuPK:300741-pagePK: 141159-piP
K:141110-theSitePK:300736,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) [hereinafter World
Bank Group, Turkmenistan Brief] (The Bank is currently unable to provide new loans
to Turkmenistan because of the nation's failure to report its external debt. This is a
violation of the Bank's negative pledge clause, and Turkmenistan has not yet met
minimum public resource management standards.).
63.
Id.
64.

Id.

65.
66.
67.

Id.
USDCITA, Political Environment, supranote 53.
Id.
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68
a fourth concern that dissuades increased foreign investment.
Finally, and most adverse to foreign investment, is the lack of "an
established rule of law, excessive and inconsistent regulation, and
unfamiliarity with international business practices." 69
The
unfriendly economic climate of Turkmenistan toward foreign
investment stands in opposition to the country's substantial
opportunity for developing its oil and gas potential. 70 Consequently,
Turkmenistan is in need of legal and economic stabilization both
domestically and internationally before it will become an attractive
71
destination for multinational foreign investment.

5. Iran
Iran is a political anomaly among the Caspian states. Iran's
peculiarity has engendered great conflict over its treatment of the
Caspian Sea's oil potential. Iran maintained its sovereign status
separate from the U.S.S.R. throughout the Soviet era. While this
allowed the nation to assemble an oil development infrastructure, its
government, being founded upon Islamic law, has been in continuous
conflict with Western democracies such as the United States since the
late 1970s. Iran insists on the validity of treaties signed with the
Soviet Union in 1921 and 1940.72 As such, Iran refuses to recognize
bilateral treaties signed between the now- independent Caspian
73
states.
A second major political difficulty surrounding Iran is its
marginalized trade status with the United States. 74 In response to a
1995 development deal between U.S. oil company ConocoPhillips and
the Iranian government to develop the Sirri oil field, then-U.S.
President Clinton issued three executive orders establishing a total
embargo on U.S.-Iran trade. 75 The impetus for the embargo was a
U.S. response to Iran's support for international terrorism, Iran's
undermining of the Middle East peace process, and its pursuit of a
76
nuclear arsenal in addition to the means to deliver such weapons.

68.
Turkmenistan: 2003 Investment Climate Statement (July 22, 2003),
available at http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/bisdoc/030722TXICS.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Turkmenistan].
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.

Id.

72.
United States Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis
Briefs, Iran: Oil- Caspian Sea Region, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
iran.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter USEIA, Iran].
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. (specific executive agreement order numbers forthcoming).
76.
Id.
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This sanction remains in place today and limits U.S. multinational
activity in Iran in several ways. 77 The first executive order prohibits
U.S. companies, but not their foreign subsidiaries, from "supervising,
managing, or financing projects relating to the development of Iran's
oil and gas resources. 78 The second executive order "established
comprehensive economic sanctions on Iran," applicable to U.S.
companies, but not their offshore subsidiaries. 79 The third executive
order closed off any loopholes that existed where goods were being
exported to Iran via third countries. 80
The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), enacted by the U.S.
Congress in 1996, is a third barrier to the development of Iranian oil
interests in the Caspian region.8 1 The ILSA imposes a secondary
boycott intended to make foreign companies choose between doing
business with Iran and Libya or doing business with the United
States. s 2 ILSA also gives the U.S. President the power to impose
sanctions on any U.S. or foreign person who after August 5, 1997,
"invests $20 million or more in an Iranian project, if the investment
directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Iran's or
Libya's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline
its oil and natural gas reserves."8 3 Such sanctions would also apply
to any joint-use agreements in the Caspian Sea, and the United
States has opposed exchanges of oil with Iran by U.S. companies on a
large scale.8 4 In practice, ILSA has not been enforced by the United
States, as evidenced by the U.S.'s allowance of France's TotalFinaElf,
Russia's Gazprom, and Malaysia's Petronas to sign a $2 billion
Such
agreement to develop the South Pars oilfield in Iran.85
deference by the United States can be attributed to a desire to avoid
conflicts with its European allies.8 6 The United States has similarly
avoided pursuing ILSA sanctions against ENI (Italy), Royal
Dutch/Shell, and BP for agreements these companies have signed
with Iran.8 7 Nevertheless, ILSA and the embargo of 1995, combined
with Iran's opposition to bilateral treaties among other Caspian
states, make Iran a problematic partner in Caspian development
efforts88
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As the history above demonstrates, Iran is in a different
situation concerning the CDP than the other former Soviet Caspian
states. Hence, for the purposes of later analysis, Iran will be treated
as an anomaly and will not be included in the general analysis.
Nevertheless, Iran is a major player in the Caspian region's oil sector,
and thus an understanding of its position is necessary.

III.

THE CHALLENGES OF AND SUGGESTED REFORMS FOR EXISTING
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

A. Internal Challenges and Suggested Reforms
Realizing the maximum benefit from multinational investment
in the Caspian's resources will require several reforms from the
Caspian states themselves. These reforms must target the following
areas: domestic political stabilization, human rights practices,
business corruption, and environmental concerns.
Following independence, each of the five Caspian nations
pursued different trajectories in reforming its political institutions
and organizations.8 9 Kyrgyzstan, a non-Caspian state bordering
Kazakhstan, has demonstrated the most liberal political climate,
undergoing dramatic political change and gaining accession into the
World Trade Organization in 1998, thus becoming the first former
Soviet state to accomplish this feat. 90 Kazakhstan has been similarly
progressive, although the country's evolution toward a more liberal
state is more evident in Kazakhstani oil industry economic policies in
than in domestic politics. 91 Concentration of wealth in the hands of a
few magnates has skewed privatization in a similar fashion to that of
Russia's privatization results. 92 Uzbekistan has been much more
cautious in reforming its political process than either Kazakhstan or
Kyrgyzstan.9 3 Similarly, Turkmenistan has developed a highly
autocratic political state and has made minimal efforts toward
reforming the political process.9 4 Obviously, Russia is not included in

89.
See Richard Pomfret, Central Asia Since 1991: The Experience of the New
Independent States, OECD Development Centre, Working Paper No. 212 (July 2003),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/58/596/227.pdf (discussing each state
bordering the Caspian Sea and their developments).
90.
Id.
91.
USDCITA, Kazakhstan, supra note 28.
Id.
92.
93.
Id.
94.
Turkmenistan, supra note 68.
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this analysis, as its political structure was at a far more developed
95
stage in 1991.
1. Domestic Political Stabilization
Given the varying degrees of stability and democratization in the
various states, what incentives exist for the Caspian states to
increase democratic participation in their governments?
The
purported benefits of democratic governance are twofold. First,
democratic support for a given leader strengthens that leader's
mandate and legitimacy. This is essential to a leader's ability to
formulate and implement new policies. Having popularly elected
leaders adds a degree of legitimacy from the perspective of foreign
parties as well. Second, perceived legitimacy will likely result in
greater trust from multinationals and foreign governments to enter
into contracts and deals with these central Asian governments. Of
course, getting the current leaders to agree to reforms that may very
well lead to them losing a firm hold on political power will doubtlessly
be a significant challenge.
Russia's sociopolitical reforms have been the most documented
among these states. Putin received 62.9 percent of the popular vote
on March 15, 2004, winning re-election to another term as
President. 96 Moreover, Moscow's continued dialogue with Western
democracies gives its economic and political reforms greater
transparency and higher visibility than its fellow littoral states.
Kazakhstan, although well on its way to liberalizing its economic and
political structures since independence, needs to further engage the
populace in the political process. 97 As one of the most progressive
nations in Central Asia, Kazakhstan should take the initiative in
98
implementing increased political expression for its citizens.
President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, despite embracing interaction
with multinationals and foreign governments over oil interests, has
nevertheless been relatively unchallenged in the domestic political
arena. 99 The remaining three states, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Iran (which for the reasons above are severely restrictive of political
expression), lag far behind in terms of political liberalization, and
they will likely oppose further democratization indefinitely. But,
MNEs engaged in Caspian oil and gas development projects may be
able to encourage reform in these countries via economic incentives

95.
analysis).
96.
97.
98.
99.

See USDCITA, Russia Fact Sheet, supra note 13 (giving a statistical
Id.
See, USDCITA, Kazakhstan, supra note 28.
See generally id. (illustrating that Kazakhstan is the emerging leader).
See id. (analyzing Kazakhstan's leaders and their respective roles).
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for governmental stability. 10 0 Domestic political stabilization in all of
the Caspian states, therefore, requires increased governmental
transparency and democratic reforms that will translate into
derivative societal ameliorations.
2. Human Rights
Human rights represents the second major internal "challenge"
that Caspian states will face. Institutional reform will have little
impact on individuals unless those measures are complemented by
human rights initiatives granting civil rights and liberties to the
general population.10 1 Gender equity is a particularly salient issue,
especially in countries such as Iran, Turkmenistan, and to a lesser
degree, Kazakhstan, which have all historically marginalized
women's rights and equality.10 2 Women need to be allowed to
10 3
participate fully in political and economic activities.
In general, attaining parity with developed economies' worker's
rights policies may not be entirely feasible, or (as some might argue)
temporarily undesirable, but basic protections need to be granted to
10 4
workers for long-term growth and stability in the workforce.
Hence, each country must address its respective human rights
problems if for no other reason than to become more economically
productive. Human rights concerns transcend national boundaries,
and pressure from MNEs, if properly wielded, could act as an
incentive for promoting human rights in the Caspian region.
3. Corruption
A third requisite area of internal reform involves substantially
reducing corruption among and between the public and private
sectors with regard to business enterprises and investment contracts.
Regulating MNE behavior in these states will prove to be an exercise
in futility if business corruption persists within these countries.
Moreover, for emerging capitalistic economies, it is imperative to
establish a regulatory system that investors can trust. Promises to
and between governments and businesses need to be kept in order to

100.
See United States Department of Commerce International Trade
Administration, available at http://www.bisnis.doc.govfbisnis/countryfkazakhstan.cfm
(n.d.) (linking to each country's commercial and market reports).

101.
See generally Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law
Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 121, 142-26 (2001) (last visited Feb. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter Cassel, Make a Difference?].
102.
Compare id., with Pomfret, supra note 89 (connecting the theory to real
information about the Caspian Sea countries).
103.
Cassel, Make a Difference?, supra note 101, at 127.
104.
Id.
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inspire the confidence necessary to grow these economies. Domestic
legal consequences must be attached to violations of accepted norms
of corporate conduct. Russia and Kazakhstan have undertaken some
reform in this area, but much needs to be done in all of the littoral
states to create corporate codes of conduct that effectively institute
105
compliance.
4. Economic Distribution
The fourth crucial area demanding internal reform is economic
An unfortunate
distribution, specifically revenue distribution.
outgrowth of the rapid demise of the Soviet system was that the
newly independent states lacked experience with running a capitalist
economy.10 6 Since gaining their independence in 1991, many Caspian
states have experienced a concentration of wealth among certain
individuals while their societies have not enjoyed an overall net
increase in income, with many states suffering a decrease in their per
capita income.1 0 7 A more egalitarian system of income distribution
with a tax system similar to those in place in Western democracies is
therefore needed to diminish wealth disparities between the
extremely affluent elite and the general population.10 8 A more
equitable per capita distribution would help to diminish the number
of people living below the national poverty line and put disposable
income in the hands of more people, thus creating a larger consumer
base for the economy.1 0 9
B. ExtraterritorialChallenges and Suggested Reforms
Concomitant with the above-mentioned internal obstacles and
reforms is the need for an appropriate role for international
involvement in the Caspian states. Rather than act as a lording
parental figure, international parties, including governments, private
enterprises, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), must
respect the sovereignty of the Caspian nations and allow internal
reforms to run their course. 110 But, these international parties may

See Business and Economy: A Stable Free Market Economy, available at
105.
http://www.kazakhembus.com/stable-free-marketeconomy.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2005) (suggesting multiple reform strategies).
106.
See Pomfret, supra note 89, at 18 (analyzing multiple internal policies and
procedures).
107.
Id. at 17, 42, 52.
Id. at 9, 11, 25-26.
108.
109.
Id. at 25-26.
Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise
110.
Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1075,
1078-79, 1108 (2002).
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nevertheless serve an instrumental role in supporting, advising, and
incentivizing these nations to institute reforms."1
A first obstacle on the road to production is the lack of an
adequate infrastructure for exporting oil and natural gas. 112 The
Baku-Thilisi-Ceyhan pipeline represents a major step forward in
improving supply networks throughout the region. 113 Despite this
improvement, much of the existing infrastructure for these extractive
industries is still in need of repair or replacement. 114 Multinational
involvement in financing such improvements is a promising solution
to this challenge, particularly when coordinated with World Bank
financing. 115
A second point of disagreement between the littoral states
116
concerns which routes to choose for exporting oil and natural gas.
Simply put, export routes running through a given nation translate
into jobs, revenues, and economic ties to international actors for the
host country. All three of these measures would greatly benefit the
developing economies of this region. Competition for the routes is
heated, and a compromise that can be accepted by all five states,
especially by Iran, which has opposed any amendments to its
bilateral agreements with the U.S.S.R. from decades past, is needed
to promote efficiency in taking these extractive resources to
117
market.
Border disputes between littoral states constitute a third
impediment to solidifying sovereignty rights for the littoral states'
natural resources. 118 Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan signed an
agreement over the territorial division of the upper portion of the
Caspian Sea in May 2003.119 Despite this agreement, Turkmenistan
and Iran are still withholding their acceptance of a multilateral
agreement dividing up the Caspian's resources. 120 Thus, sovereignty
rights represent a serious potential for conflict in the region.
Environmental concerns pose perhaps the single most important
challenge to the Caspian states in carrying out the CDP.

111.
Id.
112.
See Pomfret, supra note 89, at 31, 32, 35, 41 (generally discussing each
Caspian state's infrastructure and reform policies); Energy Information Administration
at http:I/ www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html (n.d.).
113.
Bretton Woods Project, available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/
article.shtml?cmd%5B126%5D=x-126-27515 (n.d.).
This pipeline is designed to
transport 1 million barrels of oil a day from the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of
Ceyhan. Id. Completion of the pipeline is projected for early 2005. Id.
114.
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Understandably, these countries are eager to develop the oil and gas
potential of the Caspian Sea. If development is allowed to proceed
without sufficient environmental regulation, however, marine life and
other ecological dimensions of the Caspian Sea could be
jeopardized. 121 Particular emphasis should be placed on each country
taking responsibility for its respective environmental obligations. If
four of the five littoral states individually institute environmental
reforms, but the fifth state imposes no such rules, then it may freeride off the others' costs. 1 22 Such free-riding decreases the efficacy of
environmental programs and commitment of the other states to
continue such programs. 123 Thus, mutually binding environmental
policies must be created and enforced among the states.
A final extraterritorial challenge is that diplomatic instability
between the respective Caspian region states threatens these
countries' ability to agree on a coordinated development plan. 124 This
reality also makes foreign investors looking to invest in the
development project hesitant to do so. 125 A multifaceted solution is
required for this problem, and it is in this arena that multinational
corporations should be required to fulfill uniform and predetermined
obligations. 126 While internal country- specific stabilization programs
are required for reassuring foreign investors and multinational
corporations, international actors should, in exchange for the derived
economic benefit from the oil and natural gas licenses, be required in
turn to reinvest in the respective domestic facets of the Caspian
countries. 127 First, compulsory legal standards should be imposed
upon multinational corporations to reinvest a determined percentage
of their revenues derived specifically from the extraction process back
128
into the country that tendered rights to the resources.
International oversight of such standards could be administered by
existing international bodies, as will be addressed later in this
Note. 129 The outgrowth of such a reinvestment requirement would be
threefold. First, political regimes would have an incentive to comply

121.

Id.

See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable
122.
Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 55, 99-101 (2003) (an indepth discussion on multiple environmental reforms and
their effects).
Id.
123.
Id. at 108-09 (advocating the norm of reciprocity).
124.
Id. at 108.
125.
Westfield, supra note 110, at 1106-07.
126.
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Id. at 1104-05.

For an example of such a recommendation, see generally Somini Sengupta,
128.
The Making of an African Petrostate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2004, at
www.nytimes.com2004/02/l8international/africa/18CHAD.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
For a detailed explanation, see analysis infra Part VII.
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with the regulations in order to gain international legitimacy. 130
Second, the distribution of new income would bolster the emerging
and often struggling economies of the Caspian states. 131 Finally,
portions of the fund could be directly tied to social improvement
programs such as health care, education, job training, and other
reforms designed to increase the welfare of the population as a
132
whole.
These five obstacles, while significant, are nothing more than
temporary impediments that can realistically be overcome within a
133
relatively short amount of time, perhaps within five to ten years.
First, construction of new and additional refineries within the
respective Caspian states will improve infrastructure shortcomings
on the production side. 134
Maintenance and, where needed,
13 5
construction of new oil pipelines will serve the same purpose.
Second, a consensus among the Caspian states must be reached over
designated export routes. 136 Such routes must necessarily address
issues of sovereignty and compensation dependent upon a respective
state's role in the exportation process. 137
Similarly, the third
objective of conclusively establishing defined borders must be
established in order for the second objective to be successfully
implemented. 138
Environmental integrity needs to be protected
through effective regulation of extraction procedures. Finally, refined
diplomatic relations must be established to ensure that these
challenges are conquered by cooperative solutions. Accomplishing
these reforms will require time and flexibility in implementation, but
if they are successfully instituted, significant progress can be made
toward realizing the many benefits that the Caspian's natural
resources promise these countries.
The suggested internal and external reforms are interdependent
in that progress exclusively in one arena will not alone be enough for
the Caspian states to achieve their economic potential. Thus, social
progress needs to evolve contemporaneously with economic
development to establish a stable and effective structure with which
to develop this industry.
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IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF THE
CASPIAN SEA

A. Treatment of Oil Rights Duringthe Soviet Period
Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea's
seabed and subsoil resources were, in the view of the U.S.S.R., open
only to the Soviet Union and Iran. In 1940, a Soviet-Iranian treaty
stipulated that each party had "an exclusive right of fishing in its
coastal waters up to a limit of 10 nautical miles. ' 139 In addition, the
treaty provided that ships from Iran and the U.S.S.R. were to enjoy140a
right of free and equal navigation throughout the Caspian Sea.
Impliedly, all other nations were barred from navigation or other
economic activities on the Caspian Sea, and the U.S.S.R. was
emphatic in maintaining this "closed sea" approach. 141 The U.S.S.R.
never formally delineated boundaries among its various republics
pertaining to their respective shares of the Caspian Sea, but "in
practice" petroleum operations were assigned to agencies connected to
the various republics on a geographical basis. 142 The areas presently
including the Guneshli, Chi Rag, Azeri, and Kapaz fields were
"assigned" for exploration purposes to Caspmor Nefgaz, a production
agency located within Azerbaijan. 143 Because these fields were
developed during the Soviet era, they are currently at a more
developed stage than other Caspian fields. 144 Similar development
projects were conducted in the waters off the coast of and adjacent to
145
Kazakhstan.
B. Current Treatment: 1991-Present
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the "de facto
boundaries" among the former Soviet republics have been respected
by the "successor states," and each state continues to oversee the
resources in its de facto maritime territory. 146 Turkmenistan has also
tagged its own "block," labeled "Block 1," with boundaries ranging on
the west to the eastern boundary of the Azeri fields, further
reinforcing the traditional de facto boundary between those two

139.
Scott Horton, International Law Ownership of the Caspian Seabed,
availableat http://www.pbwt.com/Resources/index-newsletter.html (n.d.).
140.
Id.
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Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have similarly honored
states. 147
Russian rights to its control over the Caspian sector adjacent to its
shoreline. 148 Moreover, Lukoil Russian, an oil and gas giant, has
begun exploration for hydrocarbons in the Russian sector.149
Despite the relatively harmonious relations of the five littoral
states following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., a disagreement arose
between Russia, which advocated common ownership, and
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, all three of which
supported delimitation according to an equidistant shoreline
formula. 150 Russia's advocacy of common ownership was rooted in
simple geography: the Russian shoreline constituted 18.5 percent of
the total Caspian coastline, while the Kazakhstani shoreline
constituted 30.8 percent of the coastline. 15 1 The shoreline of the
remaining littoral states of Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan
constituted 15.2 percent, 18.7 percent, and 16.8 percent of the
coastline, respectively. 15 2 Hence, an even twenty percent split among
the five states would have increased Russia's share of Caspian
resources while dramatically decreasing Kazakhstan's share, thus
leading to a far more advantageous economic position for Russia. 1 53
The wrangling over how to determine boundaries for the various
nations concerning Caspian sovereignty and resources was resolved,
at least in part, in May 2003, when Russia, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan divided the northern portion of the Caspian Sea into
three unequal parts. 154 A median line principle was used in which
Kazakhstan received twenty-seven percent, Russia received nineteen
percent, and Azerbaijan received eighteen percent. 155 This northern
sixty-four percent of the Caspian contains the lion's share of the
region's oil reserves, and thus development of this section's
hydrocarbon potential has been most heavily emphasized, as
evidenced by the number of large international projects within this
area. 15 6 The tripartite agreement and subsequent development
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projects should not, however, be confused with an overall consensus,
as many points of heated conflict still exist.157
C. FutureDirection: Ongoing Conflicts and Anticipated Resolutions
Of the various problems currently facing the development of
Caspian oil reserves, perhaps the most menacing one is that of
safeguarding distribution routes and pipelines given the numerous
regional conflicts in the area. 158 Afghanistan, despite the ouster of
the Taliban, is rife with regional conflicts, and such turmoil unnerves
159
investors and companies looking to run a route through this area.
The Azeri-Armenian war over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in
Azerbaijan, which is populated by Armenians, is ongoing. 160 Georgia
is a third troublesome country in the region, with the Pankisi Gorge
being dubbed the "world's second main 'nest' of terrorism" by the
Finally, the Uzbek
Russian defense minister in 2002.161
government's clamping down on fundamentalism in the country has
further increased tensions. 62 Thus, the various regional conflicts
present additional external challenges on top of the already
challenging domestic tasks faced by the Caspian states in developing
their oceanic oil reserves. 163 Should any of these potential problems
emerge, development of the CDP infrastructure could be slowed or
stopped, at least temporarily.

V. INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASPIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

A. Sovereignty Versus Stability: Mutually Exclusive Options?
Having enumerated the great economic potential of the Caspian
states as well as the numerous challenges that they face on the road
to development, a central question that emerges regards the proper
role of foreign governments and multinational involvement in the
stabilization and development of this region. The Caspian states'
shift toward market economies, in varying degrees among the
countries, has opened up opportunities for international cooperation

157.
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See U.S. Energy Information Administration (Mar. 3, 2004), available at
158.
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in developing the oil and gas resources. Contemporaneously, these
nations are sensitive to their political and economic sovereignty, and
rightly so, given the desirability and importance that such resources
have on both a domestic and international level. To effectively
address the appropriate level of international involvement, therefore,
it is necessary to examine the motivations and operational structures
of multinational corporations and then consider how these elements,
in combination with their current activity in the CDP, either do or do
not promote sustained development in these countries.
B. MultinationalEnterprises
Multinational corporations, by promising revenues via joint
development partnerships with the various nations, stand in a
position to exert influence on the political stability of the respective
countries. A compelling argument can be made that it is in the best
interests of each respective multinational corporation's management
and shareholders to require a certain level of state assurance before
investing in certain areas. 164 But, it is this same potential for
influence that poses risks for exploitation of host countries by MNEs
in their pursuit of profits. 16 5 Cutting corners in the areas of human
rights, environmental regulations, and distributing revenues in an
inappropriate manner threatens to undermine the sustained
development of these states. 166 Consequently, MNEs should not
enjoy total freedom from international oversight in this emerging
market region.
For the reasons noted previously, the nascent
political and legal structures of the Caspian states make them more
vulnerable to corporate abuses. 16 7 The regular market forces cited
frequently in reference to self-policing of developed markets have not
been developed to the same extent, if at all, in the Caspian states,
and thus a laissez-faire approach to MNE involvement would be an
irresponsible course of action for the CDP. 168
If one accepts the premise that international oversight of MNEs
in the CDP is needed, two fundamental questions emerge. First,
what codes of conduct should be adopted for MNEs to follow? Second,
what is the appropriate means of enforcing these standards? Both of
these questions are addressed in the analysis portion of this Note.

Deutsch Bank Risk Indicator, available at
164.
Eurasia Group http:////www.deutsche-bank.detpresse/en/index.html?contentOverload=http://www.deutschebank.de/presselen/releases_1344.shtml (n.d.).
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Before making an informed proposal, it is necessary to first examine
characteristics of current MNE involvement in the CDP.
1. Current MNE Involvement in the Caspian Development Project
While MNE involvement in Iran predated the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991, the newfound independence of the four former
Soviet states of the Caspian region was a powerful catalyst for MNE
interest in Caspian oil and gas, and vice versa. 169 As market
restrictions have decreased, foreign investment opportunities for
17
MNEs have grown at different rates among the different countries. 0
Given the various stages of MNE involvement, the Kazakhstani
example illustrates most simply the potential as well as the inherent
171
perils of MNE investment.
In 1993, ChevronTexaco became the first major western oil
producer to gain market access in the Caspian region when it reached
an agreement with Kazakhstan's Tengizchevroil. 172 ChevronTexaco
has expanded upon this initial venture and currently holds a stake in
the two largest fields in the Kazakhstani portion of the Caspian, the
Tengiz and Karachaganak fields, as well as exploration interests in
the Russian and Azerbaijani portions of the Caspian. 17 3 In 2001,
ChevronTexaco contributed $780 million to the $2.6 billion Caspian
Pipeline Consortium that carries oil from Kazakhstan to the Black
Sea port of Novorossiysk over a span of 1,505 kilometers (935
miles). 174 These two sites created a combined 26,500 jobs, but no
breakdown was given on how many are domestic Kazakhstanis
versus foreign management. The project also dedicated $300 million
in environmental protection designed to protect the Steppe
environment. 175 Moreover, in connection with the Tengizchevroil
project, Chevron has set up the TCO Charity consisting of a $50
million fund for Kazakhstani development projects including health
clinics, vocational training facilities, environmental beautification
176
projects, and housing for flood victims.
Multinational investment such as Chevron's in Kazakhstan is
fundamental in helping Caspian states privatize industry and set up
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working capital structures. 177 Having had no experience with a
capitalistic economy before 1991, the Caspian states need private
enterprises to lend their expertise and management to this
industry. 178 Market forces, under this arrangement, can promote
efficient profit maximization. 179 Moreover, many MNEs do in fact
contribute to the welfare of the local population, either directly
through job creation and charitable contributions or indirectly by
incentivizing local enterprises to integrate free market strategies. 80
On an even more basic level, the addition of gas stations run by
Chevron in Kazakhstan, for example, provides basic necessities, such
as gas for the vehicles of the Kazakhstani population, which were
previously scarce and difficult to attain. 181 An argument can be
made, therefore, that MNE secondary ventures such as franchising
gas and service stations increase the overall welfare, efficiency, and
mobility of the population.' 8 2 In serving these functions, MNE
presence is absolutely essential for the development and
improvement of Caspian economies.
Not all MNE involvement has resulted in an improvement in the
general welfare of the Caspian states, but regulation can help remedy
the situation. Regulation promotes two central business principles:
fair dealing and fair price.'8 3 While these two concepts are distinct
from one another, they combine to form a prevailing sense of
The development of both
legitimacy among business practices.
concepts, however, is of serious concern in a region of burgeoning
democracy such as the Caspian region, where the national leadership
may be entangled in corruption or simply lack the legal apparatus
present in more developed economies to prevent bribery and other
84
forms of corruption.
2. Concerns
a. Fair Price
Fair price, for the purposes of this Note, connotes that the price
charged or paid for a certain asset, commodity, or service
appropriately corresponds to its fair market value (FMV). l 8 5

177.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Id. at 3-4.
181.
Id. at 2.
182.
Id.
183.
Id.
184.
See generally id.
Black's Law Dictionary defines fair market value as "[tihe price that a
185.
seller is willing to accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an
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Determining FMV is done on a comparative basis to similar products
or service.18 6 When pioneering a project such as oil and gas
development in the Caspian region, a number of the figures for the
project will be fixed, such as the price per foot of the steel needed for
constructing the pipeline.' 87 The value of fixed-price items can be
easily obtained, therefore, and information on the appropriate FMV
for a fixed-price item is readily available. 8 8 More creative valuation
methods, however, must be applied to tasks such as property value,
particularly in countries that were formerly socialist economies and
therefore lack historical values for property.' 8 9
When MNEs come into a country and look to acquire property,
there may be a strong desire to offer an overly low value in order to
obtain the asset at as low a price as possible. 190 One example of this
involving the oil and gas industry recently occurred in the African
state of Chad.1 91 Chad, eager for oil company payments to lift it out
of its abject poverty, sold one village plot to a multinational firm for a
mere U.S.$130.192 While this practice may not be per se illegal, it
adversely impacts developing economies by reducing their total
revenues from certain items. Applying this concept to Kazakhstan,
even seemingly benevolent developments such as the construction of
Chevron gas stations throughout the country can have a downside as
well. 193 For instance, Chevron could, by aggressively expanding its
number of gas stations throughout the country, obtain a virtual
194
monopoly over this commodity and then severely inflate prices.

arm's-length transaction; the point at which supply and demand intersect." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (8th ed. 2004).
186.
Id.
187.

Id.

188.
189.

Id.
For a description of Black-Scholes valuation methodology, one of the

prominent valuation methods, see JACK S. LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL,
PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS (1998).

190. Id.
191.
Sengupta, supra note 128.
192. Id. Note also that of the first $25 million "signing bonus" that the oil
companies awarded Chad in 1999 for exploration and development of oil reserves, the
government spent the majority of funds on purchasing armaments, refurbishing the
ministers' offices, and other extravagances such six off-road vehicles for a single
minister. Id. Such spendthrift behavior demonstrates the risk inherent in the revenue
distribution structure of developing nations. Id. However, international regulatory
oversight by the World Bank has ensured that subsequent payments to Chad have not
suffered from similar mismanagement. Id. Acting as an intermediary between Chad's
government and various oil companies, the World Bank has required transparency
with respect to oil revenues and mandated that a citizens' committee review all
spending to guarantee that the revenues are used to improve the welfare of nine
million citizens in Chad. Id.
193.
Cf.ChevronTexaco in Eurasia, supra note 175.
194. Id.
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Without alternative suppliers, customers would be forced to pay
inflated gas prices.
A predominant counter-argument to the oversight suggested
above is that an expansion by other oil companies into Caspian
markets would introduce price competition and thus avoid
monopolization and price inflation by the presence of a single
retailer. 19 5 Without a strong legal system in place, however, collusion
and price-fixing could result among the various MNEs and the host
governments. 19 6 Moreover, given MNEs' constant push for profit
maximization, the incentives those enterprises have to avoid paying
or charging FMV for certain goods and services is a real concern. For
these reasons, international oversight of MNE pricing is needed in
the Caspian states to ensure that unfair pricing methods are not
employed by MNEs to exploit underdeveloped markets.
b. Fair Dealing
Fair dealing consists of bargaining for a good, contract, or service
197
in a manner that is roughly uniform among all competing parties.
The United States is host to more MNEs than any other single
nation, and all U.S.-based MNEs are subject to the provisions of the
The FCPA
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). 198
prohibits U.S. companies from, among other things, engaging in
bribery of foreign officials in order to secure contracts. 199 Absent
investigation by the Department of Justice, the FCPA places the onus
of assuring compliance and reporting violations upon MNEs and
foreign governments. 20 0 While such accountability from MNEs is
necessary, it may be unrealistic to place full trust in the ability of this

195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
Fair dealing is "[t]he conduct of business with full disclosure, usu. by a
corporate officer with the corporation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 633 (8th ed. 2004).
198 See International Labour Organization, Bureau of Workers' Activities,
Multinational Corporations, at http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/
multinat/multinat.htm#Geographical%20distribution%20of/o20largest%20companies
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
199.
The FCPA applies to any firm, officer, director, employee, or agent of the
firm and any stockholder acting on behalf of the firm. See Business Information
Service for the Newly Independent States, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery
Provisions, at http://www.bisnis.doc.govlbisnis/fcpl.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
Two primary areas are encompassed by the FCPA. Id. First, the Act has a blanket
prohibition against making bribes. Id. Second, the Act places responsibility on
domestic firms and its agents for bribes paid by intermediaries. Id. The Act requires
corrupt intent to be present in order to find a violation. Id.
200.
See Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights
Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1963, 1984 (1996) (describing governments'
decreasing ability to effectively safeguard human rights and the need for multinational
corporations to pick up the slack).
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sort of regulation to single-handedly govern MNE behavior
effectively. 20 1 In addition, the political philosophies of the respective
Caspian states' leaders may result in different views on corruption
than those advanced in U.S. statutes. 20 2 Consequently, U.S.-based
MNEs may suffer a competitive disadvantage in abiding by the FCPA
if MNEs from other countries are not subject to substantially similar
regulations. Moreover, host governments often adjust domestic laws
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and these governments
often turn a blind eye to violations to maintain good relations with
MNEs. 20 3 Hence, it is unrealistic to think that self-reporting by
MNEs in conjunction with regulatory cooperation from Caspian
governments will alone suffice to eliminate unfair dealing
204
practices.
To ensure that fair dealing is exercised in the awarding of
extraction contracts, there must be an effective enforcement
mechanism to compel both MNEs and the various host governments
20 5
to abide by commonly accepted principles of international business.
Currently, the lack of a capable enforcement mechanism is a problem
from which nearly all international legal agreements suffer. 20 6 Such
a mechanism is particularly important in rooting out corruption or
unfair dealing practices. 20 7
The power that the World Trade
Organization derives from binding consensus among member states
is lacking a functional equivalent in the realm of business practices in
extractive industries. 20 8 Creating a new regulatory body to conduct
such reviews would be both time-consuming and susceptible to
bureaucratic red tape. 20 9 By the time such a body were created and
became effective, oil and gas interests in the Caspian states would
already have been developed, perhaps in a haphazard manner. Thus,
an effective, time-efficient solution to enforcing fair dealing in

201.
See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, tit. 1 § 104, 91 Stat.
1496 (1977) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1988)); see also Peter Waldman,
Heavy Hand: Washington's Tilt to Business Stirs a Backlash in Indonesia, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 2004, at Al. Louis Wells, a professor at Harvard Business School, contends
that U.S. companies have circumvented the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA by
making loans to relatives of foreign officials, thus avoiding liability for direct bribery
violations. Waldman, supra.
202.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, supra note 201.
203.
Westfield, supra note 110, at 1077.
204.
See generally Natalie Laura Bridgeman, Note, World Bank Reform in the
"Post-Policy"Era, 13 GEo. INT'L ENV'TL. L. REV. 1013 (2001) (arguing the current
safeguard policies of the World Bank are ineffective).
205.
Westfield, supra note 110, at 1077-80.
206.
Id. at 1078.
207.
Id.
208.
Id. at 1076-80, 1084-86.
209.
Id.
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Caspian extractive contracts needs to be found within and among
existing international structures.

VI. TRADITIONAL WORLD BANK FINANCING STRUCTURE

Recently, the World Bank Group has come under attack from a
number of economists and governments for its inability to enforce
payment upon nations that are in default on their loans. 210 The Bank
has five divisions that both perform distinct, independent functions
and work together to provide overall management of the Bank's
loans. 211
The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) grants loans to the governments of low and
middle income nations. In return, the recipient nations are required
to pay back the loans plus an attached interest rate that is well below

rates offered by commercial lenders. 212 To finance these loans, the
IBRD issues bonds to a variety of private and institutional investors
and shareholders. 2 13
Loans from the IBRD were used in the
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, along with private
funds from ChevronTexaco. 214 IBRD loans, therefore, are already
present in the Caspian Development Project. 215 Since the Caspian
states do not qualify under World Bank standards as being among
the world's poorest nations, grants and interest-free loans from the
Bank's second division, the International Development Association,
are unavailable to the littoral states. 216 Consequently, Bank funding
217
for the Caspian Development Project must come from the IBRD.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) invests in private
enterprises in nations where access to capital is difficult or impossible
to attain. 218 IFC loans pose possibilities for a host of industries in the
Caspian nations, including the development of indigenous oil fields in
countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which currently lack the
more robust private oil and gas companies of Russia, Kazakhstan,

210.

James Bovard, Cato Policy Analysis, The World Bank Vs. the World Poor,

available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/paO92.html.
211.
The World Bank Group, supra note 51.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
See generally http://www.chevrontexaco.comlnews/archive/chevron%5Fpress
1998/98%2D03%2D02%2D1.asp (n.d.).
215.
Id.
216.
The World Bank Group, supra note 51.
217.
Id.
218.
See generally http://www.ifc.org/about (n.d.).
The IFC is a private
corporation that promotes sustainable private sector investment in developing
countries.
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and Iran. 219 Thus, IFC loans are of differing value to the various
Caspian states.
An equally important division of the World Bank is the
Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, which provides
guarantees to foreign investors against losses from non-commercial
risks incurred from events like war and inability to convert a nation's
currency. 220 This agency's usefulness in terms of the CDP is that it
gives further confidence to MNEs to invest in these states. 22 1 But,
insurance is its primary benefit, and consequently, it is a corollary
rather than primary economic force behind the financing of the
CDP. 222 Similarly, the fifth division of the Bank, the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, while providing a
negotiation mechanism, is not a driving economic force for CDP
223
financing.
1. Efficacy of the World Bank's Traditional Financing Structure
Conceptually inviting yet pragmatically troubled, the Bank's
traditional financing structure has been widely criticized, and recent
criticism has been especially pronounced. 22 4 Particularly relevant to
the Bank's involvement in the CDP has been criticism over the
Bank's inability to collect payment on its loans. 225 The World Bank is
an economic body, and as such, it has no practical means of enforcing
its policies, except refusing to fund future projects in a delinquent
nation. 226 This inability to enforce loan repayment is a major
weakness in the Bank's current structure.
What potential does the CDP offer for correcting the Bank's
enforcement problems? Were some dramatic event to occur, such as a
civil war or political upheaval in one or more of the Caspian states, it
is true that the Bank could face a default problem mirroring those of
the past. 2 27 The nature of the CDP, namely the enormous property
wealth present in the nations' respective Caspian plots, as well as the
involvement of MNEs, presents a background upon which a new
financing structure for the Bank's development loans can be tested.
The next section of this Note will explore one possible solution.

219.
Id.
220.
See generally About MIGA, at http://www.miga.org/screens/about/htm (Jan.
24, 2005).
221.
Id.
222.
Id.
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See World Bank ICSID, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/main/htm
(Jan. 24, 2005).
224.
Bovard, supra note 210.
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VII.

RETHINKING THE FINANCING STRUCTURE: MULTILATERAL
EFFORTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES

In examining potential reforms for the Bank's financing schemes
and the role of MNEs in the Caspian region, there are virtually
unlimited models in the Western business world for corporate
But these options are severely reduced when
responsibility.
corporate responsibility is transposed upon international corporate
Two predominant models for international corporate
behavior.
responsibility include a "cooperative" approach and a pragmatic,
joint-effort approach. 228 Under the cooperative approach, MNEs
work together with local governments to formulate mutually
acceptable business policies. 229 The joint-effort approach, by contrast,
is more skeptical of the ability of MNEs to effectively self-police their
bodies of
policies and therefore advocates enforcement by the "joint"
230
the World Bank and the International Court of Justice.
A. The Cooperative Approach: Wishful Thinking
The cooperative approach's merit lies in its flexibility and respect
for self-governance by both sovereign states and MNEs. 23 l Under
this approach, the burden of instituting and enforcing fair business,
human rights, and environmental policies falls primarily on the
shoulders of MNEs. 232 MNEs, particularly those with a visible
presence in developed economies like the United States, have an
interest in maintaining a reputable image of their firms as
upstanding international citizens that respect the local populations
with whom they interact. 233 For a very basic example, assume that a
U.S. shoe manufacturer employs workers in Taiwan to assemble their
products. 23 4 The MNE benefits from a cost advantage derived from
higher worker salaries in the United States. 235 But Taiwan may have
less stringent labor protections for its workers, and its minimum
wage requirements may fall, even on a relative basis, well short of
U.S. standards. From the cooperative approach, it would be in the
MNE's best interest to institute standards in excess of Taiwan's to

228.

Westfield, supra note 110, at 1078-79; Bridgeman, supra note 204, at 1040-
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ensure that the MNE maintains its status as a "reputable"
236
international citizen.
This cooperative approach delegates a tremendous amount of
power to MNEs to showcase their commitment to fair business
practices. In reality, however, the "cooperative" approach leaves open
too great an opportunity for exploitation of the host nations or their
citizens by MNEs. 23 7 Profit maximization is the foremost concern of
any MNEs, regardless of their concern for the well-being of host
nations and their citizens. 23 8 With profits at the top of their agendas,
it is highly unlikely that any MNEs will voluntarily institute
sustained development policies that put them at a competitive
disadvantage with other MNEs doing business in a given country
that choose not to institute such policies.
Another factor making voluntary self-regulation by MNEs an
unsuitable substitute for a more formal enforcement structure is that
host countries often bend their laws to attract MNEs or will often
239
have lower legal protections for labor than do Western countries.
Such inadequacy in the legal systems would provide a strong
incentive for MNEs to exploit less stringent working and
environmental regulations to create greater profit.
Finally, the cooperative approach places too great of an emphasis
on the influence that informal social norms play in regulating MNE
behavior. 240 Although MNEs would prefer a positive public image,
minor, intermittent negative press reports are unlikely to cause
MNEs to give up their profit- motivated behavior. Although the
extractive industry has been the subject of endless critiques by the
media, its members have not abandoned controversial projects such
as offshore drilling.2 41 Thus, there is no real-life precedent upon
which to base the premise that MNEs in the Caspian states will
voluntarily reform their behavior in order to avoid public critique.
B. The Joint-EffortApproach: PragmaticPrinciples
The cooperative approach, though geared toward modern codes
of corporate conduct, places too great an emphasis on optimistic
principles and too little weight on practical results. The joint-effort
approach, by contrast, provides policy ideals and proposes a structure
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240.
For a discussion of the potential impact of social norms upon corporate
environmental compliance, see Vandenbergh, supra note 122.
241.
See World Bank website, available at http://www.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAIJNEWS/0,,content MDK:20143509 (n.d.).
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with which to enforce these ideals. 24 2 One scholar advocates a twopart joint-effort structure for governing MNE behavior. 24 3 First,
244
World Bank involvement in the projects themselves is essential.
The Bank's involvement, whether in the form of partial financing in
conjunction with MNE funds (as in the case of the Baku-ThilisiCeyhan pipeline project), or in the form of more general consultation
services, is a practical way of translating "sustained development"
objectives into actual elements of a MNE deal. 245 Moreover, the
Bank's expertise in working with developing nations makes it an
appropriate body to handle the challenges of structuring MNE
24 6
projects in the Caspian states.
Since the 1980s, the Bank has operated on the "Washington
consensus" model of economic development promoting deregulation,
liberalization, privatization, and emphasizing the private sector over
state institutions. 247 This model has failed, according to critics,
because it creates economies that are too vulnerable to destabilizing
shocks. 248 In order for the World Bank to operate most effectively in
this capacity, some scholars have suggested that it undertake five
reforms. 249
First, the Bank should strive to base representation in
its organization on a "one-flag, one-vote" policy to give developing
nations a voice tantamount to those of the large economic powers on
issues that are of particular concern to them. 250
Second,
decentralization of the Bank's offices to regional or sub-regional
offices will make it more receptive to local concerns. 25 1 Third, the
Bank should strive to hire residents of the Caspian states on the
various projects so that those who have personal experience with the
252
region or issues at hand will be able to offer their tailored insights.
Fourth, to increase efficacy among Bank projects, staff should be
compensated for compliance with safeguard policies. This would
provide economic incentives for those within the Bank to achieve
compliance objectives. 253
The fifth and final suggested reform,
increased accountability, is by far the most crucial element in seeing
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this point where the jointthrough the Bank's policies, and it is at
254
effort approach is particularly relevant.
One scholar proposes a model in which the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) could establish a division for claims related to the World
Bank's international financial institutions. 255 This reform would
require that the Bank's Articles of Agreement be amended to create
liability for violations of Bank policies and for torts. 256 In addition,
these amendments would remove the Bank's immunity for its conduct
and would make the Bank accept being subjected to the ICJ's
jurisdiction.2 5 7 Such changes would allow the International Financial
Institutions division of the Bank to enforce binding judgments when
one of the Bank's policies or procedures was violated. 258 The primary
benefit of fusing the ICJ with the Bank in the enforcement context is
that it gives the Bank a means of enforcing its policies. 259 The
drawback to such a model is that it lacks flexibility as a conflict
resolution mechanism, premising its decisions upon stringent
statutory provisions. 260 But, in light of the Bank's history of difficulty
in enforcing its policies, giving up a degree of flexibility in exchange
for more definitive enforcement could be an acceptable trade-off.
1. Challenges and Impediments
For a collaborative effort between the WTO and ICJ to
effectively police interactions between MNEs and Caspian
governments, several procedural and practical obstacles must be
overcome. The ICJ's jurisdiction over bringing claims against MNE
behavior presents such an obstacle. 261 The ICJ's jurisdiction is
restricted to sovereign states. 26 2 Thus, a state bringing a claim
against a MNE could attempt to bring suit against the MNE's country
of incorporation, which would in turn have to impose any penalties.
But, such a suit would still fall outside the jurisdiction of the ICJ and
therefore fail on jurisdictional grounds.2 63 Moreover, even if the
jurisdictional hurdle could somehow be circumvented, the efficacy of
this adjudicatory structure would be dependent upon the various
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member states honoring the decisions of the ICJ. 2 64 Consequently,
while a "cooperative approach" to MNE governance promises great
potential, this potential cannot be achieved in the form of a joint
effort between the WTO and ICJ.
A second form of joint effort could be in the form of multinational
adherence to a legal principle analogous to the United States' Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA).2 65 Such a regulation would allow foreign
persons to bring suit against MNEs without having to go through the
MNEs respective national governments. 266 Such a direct course of
action is particularly important in situations in which Caspian
governments might hesitate in prosecuting MNEs for various
violations because of the revenues generated for the states by MNEs.
In addition, it would allow citizens to report incidents of corruption or
267
bribery involving government officials and MNEs.
Functionally, however, a multinational ATCA equivalent would
have very limited applicability. Since this Act pertains to torts,
defendants could presumably end-run liability by classifying a
particular claim in a non-tort context. 268 Thus, if certain claims were
held to be outside the purview of tort law, there would be little or no
redress for victims of MNE exploitation. Perverse incentives would
also be created to avoid liability, rather than to implement good faith
efforts for establishing entire fairness.
2. A Functional Alternative
A new, non-traditional, and likely controversial form of
international oversight would best promote the goals of
reapportioning voting power within the Bank: decentralizing the
bank's offices, hiring residents of the regions in which projects occur,
increasing the efficacy within the Bank, and increasing
accountability. A tripartite structure that would link the World
Bank, MNEs, and Caspian governments poses the best opportunity
for effective promotion of sustained development in this region.
Rather than having the IBRD grant loans directly to the Caspian
governments, the Bank could channel these loans to MNEs instead to
defray the cost of development projects. The MNEs would then be
responsible for these loans in addition to whatever funds they had

264.
Id. art. 34-38.
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28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
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already committed to a given project. Were the MNEs to keep the
entire amount of the loan, the Bank would then impose an interest
spike on the loan amount. For example, if the current market
interest rate for a certain type of loan was eight percent, the Bank
might charge the MNEs ten percent for a given loan. If the MNEs
distributed this loan amount to the Caspian states, however, the
interest rate that the MNEs would then owe the Bank would be at
the below-market rates that the Bank would charge a developing
nation. The Caspian states would then be responsible for paying back
the principal and same interest rate to the loaning MNEs.
All three groups have incentives for agreeing to such a structure.
First, MNEs would have an incentive to use Bank loan financing as a
way of getting better interest rates on loans to fund a project than
they could obtain via an open-market debt-financing structure. The
Bank, in turn, could exercise far greater enforcement of its policies
through this structure. In addition to the conditions stipulated above
on loans made to MNEs, the Bank could further condition eligibility
for such funding upon compliance with the various reform initiatives
as being fundamental to sustained development in the region.
Caspian states, in turn, would benefit from getting funding for the
CDP, while promoting their own socioeconomic development. Ties to
MNEs would similarly be strengthened.
The nature of the CDP as an extractive process is the final piece
that makes this proposal possible. Since oil and gas are tangible
commodities, MNEs could demand property interests as collateral
against the loans extended to MNEs. These property interests could
be amortized proportionately to how much of the loan had been
repaid. When the loans have been fully paid off by the Caspian
states, they would then assume full title to the collateralized property
tracts. Unlike more speculative, less tangible projects, Caspian states
can be relatively confident that major income can be derived in a
This relative assurance
short period of time from the CDP.
substantially reduces the risk to the loaning MNEs and the Caspian
states since repayment of the loans is predicated upon a relatively
calculable resource.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The emergence of the CDP could not have come at a more
opportune time for the Caspian states. World oil prices are streaking
toward an all-time high. 269 Conventional oil and gas supplies from
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the Middle East exist in a turmoil-filled environment because of the
tenuous relationship between the various world economies arising
from terrorism concerns and political conflicts.2 70 In this context, the
CDP stands on the verge of a major leap onto the world economic
scene.
The CDP offers great potential for economic stabilization and
social improvements in the host nations. It simultaneously poses
lucrative profit potential for MNEs looking to invest in this region.
MNE involvement in the project is therefore fundamental to the
success and the timely attainment of these potential benefits. But,
without the requisite governance structure in place, the CDP's
potential could go unrealized by those who would most benefit from
its revenue creation. As such, a joint international regulatory process
must be implemented that appropriately connects the interests of the
Caspian states and MNEs and accommodates international corporate
norms of behavior.
A tripartite structure linking the World Bank, MNEs, and
Caspian states poses the most functional and time-sensitive means of
achieving the requisite oversight.
All three entities are
interconnected under this framework, and each party has adequate
safeguards to provide insurance against default by one of the other
parties.
Moreover, each of the parties would enjoy significant
benefits from the tripartite model. First, the Bank can increase its
enforcement ability by making loans to MNEs that have more liquid
capital structures with which to repay the loans. MNEs would
benefit from gaining contributory financing for extractive projects as
well as the flexibility option to keep Bank funds for their own use,
albeit at an above-market rate. Finally, Caspian states would benefit
from receiving below-market-rate loans as well as connections to
MNEs based in developed economies.
If properly administered,
therefore, governance of MNEs in the CDP promises great potential
for accelerating the sustained development of the Caspian states.
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